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Company (Aramco) stated: "According to a great principle of
public international law, the ports of every State must be open to
foreign merchant vessels and can only be closed when the vital
interests of the State so require."'2 This statement has become the
leading authority for a right of entry. However, the Tribunal in
the Aramco arbitration was mistaken in advancing this proposition
of law. The passage cannot stand as authority for a right of entry.
This article will examine the Aramco arbitration together with
the authorities upon which the Tribunal relied. It will also con-
sider other authorities and sources of law which might offer the
evidence in support of a right of entry. The second part of the
article will attempt to define a right of entry, and it will discuss
the sparse precedents of State practice. It will then review the
arguments advanced by publicists concerning the right of entry.
Finally a formulation of the current body of law will be attempted,
suggesting that no right of entry has been established in customary
international law.
THE ARAMCO ARBITRATION OF 1958
The Facts
At issue in the Aramco arbitration was the interpretation of a
1933 agreement between the Saudi Arabian government and
Aramco. Article 1 of the agreement accorded Aramco "the exclusive
right, for a period of sixty years. .. , to explore, prospect, drill for,
extract, treat, manufacture, deal with, carry away and export petro-
leum." In 1954 the Saudi government concluded an agreement with
A. S. Onassis which provided for the establishment of a fleet of
tankers to sail under the Saudi Arabian flag. The fleet was to be
operated by the Saudi Arabian Maritime Tankers Company Ltd.
(Satco), a company formed by Onassis for this purpose. The 1954
agreement further provided that the Saudi Arabian government
would compel all oil companies operating under concessions in
Saudi Arabia to use Satco tankers when shipping their oil from
Saudi Arabia. Included within this group was Aramco. However,
Aramco argued that the priority right to transport given to Satco
conflicted with the "exclusive right to carry away and export
petroleum" which it had been granted in -he 1933 agreement. The
Saudi Arabian government denied the existence of any conflict,
claiming that Aramco's exclusive rights extended only to the area
2. 27 I.L.R. 117, 212 (Int'l Lab. Org. Ad. Trib. 1958) [hereinafter cited
as Aramco Tribunal].
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covered by the concession, not to the shipping of oil beyond Saudi
Arabian territory.
The Award
The Tribunal held that the 1933 agreement applied to the distri-
bution of oil both within and without the concession area. Thus,
the enforcement of Satco's "priority right to transport" under the
1954 agreement amounted to a breach of the 1933 agreement for
which the Saudi Arabian government was liable.3 This conclusion
was all that was necessary for the resolution of the dispute.
Nevertheless, the Tribunal went on to comment upon the right of
entry into ports in customary international law. The Tribunal
apparently embarked upon this topic on its own initiative. Aramco
had not argued in either its written or its oral submissions that
a right of entry to Saudi Arabian ports existed for their customers'
ships. Rather, Aramco's counsel had relied upon the company's
rights under the 1933 agreement. 4 In fact, counsel for Aramco im-
pliedly recognized that no general right of access existed. He con-
trasted the "ports of Saudi Arabia, which form part of Saudi Ara-
bian territory, and over which His Majesty has full and unrestricted
sovereignty" with "the territorial waters contiguous to the coast
... over which the sovereignty extends subject to certain limi-
tations generally acknowledged in International Law."5
The Tribunal, though asserting that a general right of entry to
maritime ports existed in customary international law, acknowl-
edged that States had a right to supervise entry: "International
case-law and doctrine unanimously admit that "for the purpose of
3. The Tribunal noted that "Aramco can exercise this right of transport
as it chooses, by such means and on such terms as Aramco may deem ad-
visable, whether by tankers owned or chartered by it, or by the conclusion
of maritime sales f.o.b. in which its buyers themselves undertake to supply
the tankers and to effect the transportation, or by any other means at its
discretion, with the only exception of transport by aeroplanes." Id. at 227.
It was evident that "[a] priority to transport Aramco oil, and an under-
taking by the Government to compel the company to load and carry
away its oil and products sent to foreign countries on tankers owned by
Satco are in obvious conflict with Aramco's right of transportation by sea."
Id. at 210.
4. Transcript of the Sessions of the Tribunal 333-53, Aramco Tribunal,
supra note 2, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
5. Id. at 333.
furthering its commercial, fiscal and political interests a State must
be able to supervise all ships entering, leaving or anchoring in its
territorial waters." Nevertheless, the Tribunal thought that:
[Tihe territorial sovereignty of the State over its means of mari-
time communication is not unrestricted. It can only be exercised
within the limits of customary international law, of the treaties
the State has concluded and of the particular undertakings it has
assumed.
According to a great principle of public international law, the
ports of every State must be open to foreign merchant vessels and
can only be closed when the vital interests of the State so require.0
These statements demonstrate the Tribunal's belief that in addition
to rights of entry established by treaty, a right of entry exists under
customary international law. Thus the Tribunal concluded that:
Freedom for foreign vessels to enter the ports of a State implies
the right to load and unload goods. It follows that [Aramco], by
virtue of the Law of Nations, is plainly entitled to sell its oil ...
to any purchasers it chooses, under such terms and conditions as
are agreed upon with them, and thus to conclude f.o.b. sales, in
which tankers are supplied by the buyers.7
However, this conclusion had already been reached by construing
the 1933 agreement. The discussion of a general right of access
was superfluous. Nevertheless, the comments could be considered
a correct statement of the law if in fact they accurately reflected
the authority on the question.
What authority did the Tribunal cite for its great principle of
public international law? First, it cited Guggenheim's Traitd de
droit international public. Second, it claimed that the principle was
"clearly provided in Article 16 of the Statute on the international
regime of maritime ports, of 9 December 1923,"8 which was annexed
to the Geneva Convention on the International Regime of Maritime
Ports. Neither authority, both of which will be examined, lends




The material passage of the Guggenheim work cited by the
Tribunal is short and to the point:
6. Aramco Tribunal, supra note 2, at 212.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Seaports are ... integral parts of the territory of the State.
They belong to its maritime ways. Nevertheless, customary inter-
national law, bilateral treaties, as well as the Statute on the Regu-
lation of Maritime Ports of December 9, 1923 . . . limit consider-
ably the territorial sovereignty of the State.
Seaports are in principle open to foreign commercial vessels and
may be closed only when the 'vital interests of the State so require.9
Despite the clear wording of this passage, Guggenheim may not
have intended to suggest the existence of a general right of access.
In his observations on M. Castberg's draft report to the Institute
of International Law on the distinction between the territorial sea
and internal waters, 10 Guggenheim wrote:
[Aluthors who affirm that the coastal State does not have the right
to declare a port closed to foreign commercial vessels do not state
a rule consistent with positive law. It is a question of a presump-
tion and not of an obligation. I held the same point of view
in my Lehrbuch des Volkerrechts, volume 1, page 381, note 139.11
This viewpoint does not render impossible a rule forbidding closing
of all the ports of a State or a rule forbidding closing except under
special circumstances. However, Castberg, with whom Guggenheim
expressly agreed, denied the existence of any residual right of entry
in customary international law. Castberg noted that:
[O]ne may lay down as a principle that the access to the ports
of a State is open to foreign vessels, on condition, however, that
the State in question has not established regulations to the con-
trary. But it is a question here ... of a presumption and not of
an obligation.
12
9. Les ports de mer sont ... parties int~grantes du territoire
de 'Etat. Ils appartiennant ' ses voies de communications mar-
times. Toutefois, le droit international coutumier, les traites bilat-
eraux, ainsi que le Statut sur le r6gime international des ports
maritimes du 9 decembre 1923 ... limitent d'une fagon appr6-
ciable la souverainet6 territoriale de l'Etat.
Les ports de men sont en principe ouverts aux navires de com-
merce 6trangers. Leur f~rmeture n'est pas admissable que si les
intrcts vitaux de l'Etat l'exigent.
GUGGENHEIM, supra note 1.
10. [1954] ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 113 [here-
inafter cited as ANNIAR].
11. [L]es auteurs qui affirment que l'Etat riverain n'a pas la facult6
de d~clarer un port ferm6 aux navires de commerce 6trangers
n'enoncent pas une r~gle conforme au droit positif. Il s'agit en
effet d'une pr~somption et non d'une obligation. J'ai soutenu le
m~me point de vue que vous dans mon Lehrbuch des Volkerrechts,
tome 1, p. 381, note 139.
12. "[U]1 peut 8tre pos6 en principe que l'acces des ports d'un Etat est
ouvert aux navires 6trangers, A condition toutefois que l'Etat en question
Even if it is assumed that Guggenheim asserted a right of access,
his authority for such a right was inapposite. He cited Gidel and
Ralston for the proposition in the last paragraph of his Traite6
(supra), and in fact neither authority supports the proposition.
Gidel
Gidel13 began by noting the resolutions adopted by the Institute
of International Law at its 1898 and 1928 sessions. The 1898 text
provided that "[a] s a general rule access to ports . . . is pre-
sumed to be open to foreign vessels." This was amended in the
1928 to read "[a]s a general rule access to ports . . . is open to
foreign vessels."'14 Gidel, who was the Rapporteur for the com-
mission drafting the 1928 text, had noted that "[t]he text of 1898
posed only a presumption of openness . . but it did not impose
any obligation on the State to maintain its ports open .... The
[1928] text, on the contrary, lays down this obligation."' Al-
though the 1928 text was adopted by a large majority, it laid down
a rule de lege ferenda. Gidel later wrote: "It cannot be denied that
the progressive solution, clearly in accordance with doctrine-with
which the Institute of International Law sided-is ahead of present
day practice."' 6 Thus, the 1928 text was without binding effect, and
any value which it would have had as an exposition of the views
of jurists was severely restricted because the text was not generally
considered to reflect the state of the law.
Gidel also outlined State practice regarding admission to ports.
He cited Fauchille's note on the Portendick incident of the nine-
teenth century.
At the time (1834) the conflict which was to come to a head in
the present arbitration rose, it was admitted without difficulty that
a State could arbitrarily close its ports to foreign vessels. This
is because commerce among States was considered not as a true
right, accompanied by correlative duties, but as something discre-
n'ait pas 6tabli des dispositions en sens contraire. Mais il s'agit ici ...
d'une pr6somption, et non pas d'une obligation." Id. at 133.
13. 2 GIDEL, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA ME 39 (1932) [here-
inafter cited as GIDEL].
14. "En r~gle g6n~rale l'accis des ports ... est pr~sum6 ouvert aux
navires 6trangers." 17 ANNUAIE 274 [1898]. "En r~gle g~n~rale, l'acc~s
des port . . .est ouvert aux navires 6trangers." 35 ANNUAIRE 736 [1928],
supra note 10.
"En r~gle g~n6rale, l'accis des port ... est ouvert aux navires
6trangers."
15. "Le texte de 1898 posait seulement une pr~somption d'ouverture...
mais il n'imposait aucune obligation a l'Etat de maintien ses ports ouverts
... Le texte du [1928], au contraire, pose cette obligation." [1928] 35
ANNuAiE 527, supra note 10.
16. "On ne saurait se dissimuler que la solution progressive et nettement
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tionary. Being the absolute master of its territory, every State was
free either to establish relations with other nations, or to refuse
to have any communication with them. This doctrine was clearly
affirmed by all the authors who were authorities in the nineteenth
century.17
Gidel also commented on the closure of Buenos Aires: "The
same doctrine still prevailed at the time when the matter of the
closing of the port of Buenos Aires was settled by arbitration
(August 1, 1870)." He cited documents connected with the closure
to support his argument.'8
Although at one point Gidel seemed to assert a right to trade,
19
his conclusion on the state of the law during the early twentieth
century appears unambiguous: "[T] he rule which remains in force
in general international law is that of the simple presumption of
openness of ports to foreign vessels, but not of the obligation to
open ports to those vessels.120 The same view of the law is im-
plicit in Gidel's citation of the Orinoco arbitration 21 and in his
opinion that no right of innocent passage existed for foreign ships
passing through territorial waters to ports.2 2  There could be no
dans le sens de la doctrine--- laquelle l'Institut de Droit International s'est
rang--est en avance sur la pratique actuelle." 2 GimEL, supra note 13,
at 41; cf. [1928] 35 ANNUAIRE 200-16, supra note 10.
17. A l'epoque (1834) ou s'61eva conflit qui devait aboutir au present
arbitrage, il 6tait admis sans difficult6 qu'un Etat pourrait arbitrairement
fermer ses ports aux navires 6trangers. C'est que le commerce mutuel des
Etats 6tait consid~r6 non comme un droit veritable, accompagn6 d'un
devoir correlatif, mais comme un simple facult6. Maitre absolu de son
territoire, tout Etat 6tait libre soit d'entrer en rapports avec les autres
nations, soit de refuser toutes communications avec elles. Cette doctrine
6tait nettement affirm6 par tous les auteurs qui faisaient autorit6 du com-
mencement du XIX ° si&cle.
18. 2 GIDEL, supra note 13, at 43. "La m&me doctrine prevailait encore
au moment 6u fut tranch6e par arbitrage l'affaire de la fermeture du port
de Buenos Ayres (ler a6ut 1870)." I A.G. LAPRADELLE & N.S. PoLmis,
RECEUIL DES ARBITRAGES INTERNATIONAUX 532 (1905) [hereinafter cited as
LAPRADELLE-POLITIS]. In fact the British government acknowledged the
legality of the closure and claimed damages for injury flowing from the
lack of notice of the closure. II id. at 664 (1924).
19. GIDEL, supra note 13, at 45.
20. "[L] a r6gle demeurant en vigueur dans le droit international g~n~ral
[est] celle de la simple pr~somption de l'ouverture des ports aux navires
6trangers, mais non celle de l'obligation d'ouverture des ports A ces
navires." Id. at 50.
21. See text accompanying note 24 infra.
22. 3 GIDEL, =upra note 13, at 204. Gidel claimed that this was the gener-
ally accepted view.
general right of entry to ports without a right of access through
territorial waters. Thus Gidel is not authority for the existence of
a general right of entry.
Ralston
Ralston's 23 views are so clearly opposed to Guggenheim's that it
is difficult to imagine why Guggenheim cited him. The Ralston
citation, which refers to the Orinoco case, reads as follows:
In the case of the Orinoco Steamship Company the umpire recog-
nized [a Government's] "right to open and close, as a sovereign
on its own territory, certain harbours, ports and rivers in order
to prevent the trespassing of fiscal laws" and said that this right
could not be denied, much less "when used in defence not only
of some fiscal rights, but in defence of the very existence of the
Government .... "24
If the most which can properly be said of this case is that it does
not support the existence of a right of entry, Ralston's next para-
graph more clearly presumes that no such right exists:
In the Poggioli case, damages having been claimed for the closing
of a port with consequent injury to the commerce of the claimant,
and it having been alleged that the reason for such closing was
entirely insufficient, and that the port was closed simply as a mat-
ter of spite towards the claimants, the umpire remarked:
"This may have been the case, but the umpire has nothing what-
ever to do with the reasons inducing the government to close
the port. The umpire assumes that it was within its police power
to close it, and no contract existing between the Poggliolis and
the Government (as in the Martini case), by virtue of which
damages could be claimed, the power of the government must
be regarded as plenary and the reasons for its exercise beyond
question."
2 5
Ralston too is not supportive of a right of entry in customary law.
The Geneva Statute of 1923
Article 16 of the Geneva Statute of 1923,26 which the Tribunal
cited as authority, does not deal with a right of entry. Rather,
it deals with the right of parties to close their ports:
23. J.H. RALSTON, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
(1926).
24. Id. at 305.
25. Id. at 306. In the Martini case the right to close the port was simi-
larly upheld, but the consequent breach of a contract between Martini and
the government entitled Martini to damages.
26. Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports, annexed to
the Convention on the International Regime of Maritime Ports, Geneva, 9
December 1923; 28 L.N.T.S. 115. The United States is not a party.
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Article 16. Measures of a general or particular character which
a Contracting State is obliged to take in case of an emergency af-
fecting the safety of the State or the vital interests of the country
may, in exceptional cases and for as short a period as possible,
involve a deviation from the provisions of Articles 2 to 7 inclusive,
it being understood that the principles of the present Statute must
be observed to the utmost possible extent.
The right of entry is provided in Articles 2 through 7 of the statute.
The relevant provision is found in the first paragraph of Article
2:
Subject to the principle of reciprocity and to the reservation set
out in the first paragraph of Article 8, every Contracting State un-
dertakes to grant the vessels of every other Contracting State
equality of treatment with its own vessels, or those of any other
State whatsoever, in the maritime ports situated under its sover-
eignty or authority, as regards freedom of access to the port, the
use of the port, and the full enjoyment of the benefits as regards
navigation and commercial operations which it affords to vessels,
their cargoes and passengers.
The purpose of the Geneva Convention was to secure equality of
treatment for vessels in foreign ports, not to establish a general
right of entry. As the preamble stated, the Convention intended
to secure "in the fullest measure possible. . . freedom of communi-
cations . . . by guaranteeing in the maritime ports under [the]
sovereignty or authority [of the Parties] and for the purposes of
international trade equality of treatment between the ships of all
the Contracting States, their cargoes and passengers." In other
words, the Convention regulated the conditions of entry rather than
the right of entry.
It might still be argued that the limitations on the closure of ports
expressed in Article 16 implied a general right of access. However,
such a right would be binding only upon parties to the Convention.
In order to bind non-signatories, a right of entry would also have to
be a part of customary international law. This situation could
occur only if the Convention had codified an existing right of entry
or had generated a right of entry which later passed into customary
law. 27 The Tribunal did not produce evidence that there was any
preexisting rule. In fact Gidel's comments and the evidence of
State practice suggest that no such rule existed. Similarly, no
27. Cf. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary Law,
[1965-66] XLI Barr. Y.B. INT'L L. 275 (1968).
evidence was proffered to show that the rule had passed into
customary law. Indeed, it is doubtful whether such a rule could
pass into customary law. Article 2 of the 1923 Convention imposes
a condition of reciprocity. Article 8 allows States to limit access
of ships whose flag States do not effectively apply provisions of
the statute in their own ports. Thus, it is questionable if the pro-
vision had the "fundamentally norm-creating character" necessary
to form the basis of a general rule of law. In the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases the International Court of Justice deemed
this character a prerequisite for the transformation of conventional
rules into customary law.28
Neither the Geneva Statute of 1923 nor the other authorities
cited by the Aramco Tribunal support the existence of a rule of
customary international law giving merchant ships a right of access
to foreign maritime ports. Thus, the Tribunal could not properly
assert that a "great principle of public international law" existed
which provided for a right to entry. Nevertheless, is there a satis-
factory basis which can be found in customary law for such a
principle?
THE PosITIoN IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Scope of a Right of Entry
Before attempting to discover the position of international law
concerning the right of entry, it is necessary to define the scope of
the inquiry by disposing of those aspects of the general problem
of entry to ports with which the central issue is sometimes confused.
The Right to Nominate Maritime Ports
A State has the generally recognized right to decide which of
its ports are to be open to international maritime commerce. No
author has proposed a right of access to all those places along a
State's coast which might be called ports. The rule ascribing this
right of port nomination to the coastal State has been well estab-
lished in State practice from the earliest times to the present day.29
28. [1969] I.C.J. 41-43. The comments of the court on the extreme cau-
tion to be observed in claiming that conventional rules have passed into
customary law are also much in point.
29. See, e.g., Newcastle v. Tinmouth, reprinted in HALE, DE PORTIBUS
MlA s, ch. VI, included in 1 HARGRAVE, A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE
TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND (1787); Attorney General v. Bates [1610] 2 State
Trials 371; 7 HALSBuny's LAWS OF ENCLAND paras. 1014-15 (4th ed. 1974).
See also the Bulgarian Decree of 10 Oct. 1951, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/6,
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Its acceptance is reflected in the writings of many jurists.
3 0
The Right to Close Ports in Cases of Necessity
It is also generally accepted that under certain circumstances
States are entitled to close those ports which are normally open
to international traffic. The right of closure for national security
is well established. Additionally, some evidence
3 ' supports the
view advanced by many writers32 that the right of closure extends
to a wide variety of circumstances in which the coastal State deems
closure "necessary to the peace, safety and convenience of its own
citizens."33 In this connection it may be mentioned that no doubt
exists that warships may be denied entry to maritime ports.
34
Because a coastal State could suspend passage through its terri-
torial sea for want of innocence when that passage was prejudicial
to the State's "peace, good order, or security,"3 5 it could also in
effect deny entry to its ports when the same interests are prejudiced.
at 84; the El Salvadoran Civil Code of 1860, id. at 128; the Guatemalan
Act of 10 June 1934, id. at 141; the Roumanian Decree No. 39 of 28 Jan.
1956, id. at 238; the Yugoslavian Regulations of 2 Feb. 1949, id. at 317;
the Chinese Law of 14 March 1957, cited in Tao Cheng, Communist China
and the Law of the Sea, 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 47, 68 (1969) [article herein-
after cited as Tao Cheng]; the Spanish Royal Decree of 20 June 1852, 1
FOREIGN REL. U.S. 227 (1923); the Soviet Rules of Entry, 1926, QUARTERLY
REV. USSR CHAMBER COMM., July 1932, at 75; the USSR Statute on the
State Boundary, I NEW DIRECTIONS IN T=E LAW OF THE SEA 29 (1973) [here-
inafter cited NEW DIRECTIONS].
30. See, e.g., C. BALDONi, IL MARE TERMrTORIALE NEL DmITTO INTERNA-
ZIONALE COMMUNE 99 (1934); HYDE, supra note 1, at 582; H MooRE, supra
note 1, at 270; IV KIss, REPERTOIRE DE LA PRACTIQUE FRANgAISE 39 (1962);
VERZrJL, supra note 1, at pt. HI, at 240.
31. E.g., the Orinoco case discussed in text accompanying note 24 supra;
the Faber case, cited in LAUTERPAcET, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL COMMUNITY 290 (1933); cf. 77 REVUE G NERALE DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL PUBLIC 854 (1973) [hereinafter cited as RGDIP]. 79 id. at 488
(1975). See also Point VIII of the Bases of Discussion on the Responsibility
of States, League of Nations Doc. C.75.M.69.1929.V., at 104.
32. E.g., GUGENmiM, supra note 1, at 419; LATOUR, supra note 1, at 41;
LAUN, supra note 1, at 30; L.M. HYDEMAN & W.H. BERMAN, INTERNA-
TIONAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MARrrM ACTIVITIES 133-34 (1960); ROUSSEAU,
supra note 1, at 431.
33. Per Duffield, umpire, in the Faber case, supra note 31.
34. See the incidents cited at 64 RGDIP, supra note 31, at 809 (1960).
35. Art. 16(1) of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Con-
tiguous Zone, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Territorial Sea
Convention].
The Duty to Give Notice of Closure
Some commentators have suggested that an additional rule
applies in all cases of port closure. This rule posits that the port
State is responsibile for any damage caused by insufficient notice
of the closure.36 The State's liability would, however, depend upon
the lack of notice and not upon the fact of closure. Therefore, even
if such a rule did exist, it would not be relevant to the existence
of a right of entry in customary law.
The Right to Regulate Entry
A coastal State has a wide right to regulate entry to its ports.
This right has long been established as a rule of customary inter-
national law and is not questioned by any of the leading authori-
ties.37 However, the right of regulation is not unlimited. It may
not be exercised to deny any right of entry which may exist to
the ports of the State.88 The commentary to Draft Article 3 in
the text adopted by the committee at the 1930 Hague conference
provides that "as regards access to ports . . . , any facilities the
State may have granted in virtue of international obligations con-
cerning free access to ports... , may not be restricted by measures
taken in those portions of the territorial sea which may be re-
garded as approaches to the said ports or navigable waterways."3' 0
The same principle clearly applies to action taken in internal
waters. It may be difficult, however, in any particular case to
decide whether a regulation is so onerous as to amount to a denial
of the right of entry.
40
The Question of the Recognition of the Flag
Some commentators have suggested that any right of access
which does exist may be limited to ships flying the flags of States
36. See the Portendick affair discussed in text accompanying note 17 su-
pra; the Buenos Aires affair, id.; the Faber case, supra note 31; the Martini
case, supra note 25 and accompanying text; Gidel, [1928] 35 ANNUAinE,
supra note 10, at 211; VFEZIJL, supra note 1, at pt. III, at 240.
37. See, e.g., AzuNi, supra note 1, at 286; DE Cussy, id., titre II.
38. Cf. COLOMBOS, supra note 1, at 177. Many writers argue that a general
principle prohibiting the abuse of rights exists in international law. See,
e.g., PoLrTIs, supra note 1, at 77-109; LAUTERPAcHT, supra note 31, 1 ch. XIV;
B.O. Iluyomade, 16 HARv. INT'L L.J. 47 (1975); G.D.S. Taylor, [1975] XLVI
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323.
39. League of Nations Doc. C.230.M.117.1930.V., at 7.
40. For example, how far would the adoption of systems of certification
at variance with those agreed by IMCO and WHO be permissible? Cf.
the Convention on the Facilitation of Maritime Traffic, 9 April 1965, 591
U.N.T.S. 265.
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recognized by the port State. This view was expressed by M.
Niboyet in his 1926 report to the International Law Association.
Included in the report was a Draft Article which provided "Ships
flying flags of a recognized State are granted access to ports."41
Niboyet did not explain the origin of or the reasons for this princi-
ple. When the United States government was confronted with the
possible entry into its ports of ships sailing under the unrecognized
Manchukuoan flag, it was apparently unsure of its position in inter-
national law. Assistant Secretary of State Monroe wrote:
Regardless of the question whether as a matter of law we could
definitely forbid the entry of such a vessel we are entitled to say
to anyone concerned that we should regard with disfavour any at-
tempt at such entry and that we would prefer that the attempt
be not made and the legal issues be not raised.42
A different view was expressed four years later by Hackworth.
He wrote:
The question of political recognition is a matter of intention, and
I know of no theory by which it could successfully be contended
that a State must refuse to allow a merchant ship of a non-
recognised State to come into its ports in order to avoid such
recognition.4 3
Monroe was unsure of the law but sought to exclude such ships,
while Hackworth saw no obstacle to their admission. However,
their main concern was the effect of admission on recognition,
rather than of recognition on admission.
A clearer position was taken by the government of the People's
Republic of China. In 1950 the Chinese government promulgated
the Provisional Rules Governing the Entry of Merchant Vessels
... of States Having No Diplomatic Relations with the Republic
of China.44  These regulations required such merchant ships to
obtain special permits from the government before entering its
ports. The rights of ships sailing under the flags of unrecognized
States or of States having unrecognized governments are not alto-
gether clear and are beyond the scope of this article.
41. "Sont admis dans les ports les navires battant pavillon d'un Etat
reconnu," INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSocIATIoN, 34TH REPORT 456 (Vienna,
1926).
42. Printed in 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 601 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as WHITEMAN].
43. II G.H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 207 (1941).
44. U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.B/6, at 112.
The Right of Entry in Distress
All merchant ships in distress have a right to enter the ports
of a foreign State.4 5 This right is grounded upon humanitarian con-
siderations. It therefore attaches to the distressed boat rather than
to its flag State and is not affected by questions of recognition.
The preceding paragraphs have narrowed the scope of the investi-
gation. The question which emerges for examination may now be
reformulated: In the absence of exceptional circumstances in the
port State, and apart from treaty, is there a right of entry to the
designated maritime ports of a State for ships sailing under recog-
nized foreign flags, when those ships are not in distress?
State Practice Concerning the Right of Entry
At least since the 1930 Hague codification conference, the right of
innocent passage through the territorial sea has extended to ships
making for internal waters;46 however, innocent passage does not
necessarily entail a right to enter those waters. It does,
nevertheless, permit the possibility of a right of entry under
customary law-a right which would not be possible if the definition
of innocent passage excluded voyages into internal waters.
Practice Suggesting that a Right of Entry Exists
Practice suggesting that a right of entry exists is rare. In ad-
dition to the ill-founded remarks of the Aramco arbitration, two
examples of claimed right of entry should be noted. The first con-
cerned the right of entry of Italian warships into Ottoman ports.
These remarks would also apply a fortiori to merchant ships. The
Italian government asserted that "[t] he free access of our ships to
the ports of the Empire is a right assured in fact by treaties as well
as by international usage.'' 47  However, no precedent or authority
was cited.
45. See, e.g., the Creole case, (1853), reprinted J.B. MooR, INTERNA-
T oNAL ARBITRATIONS 4375; R. v. Flahaut [1935] 2 D.L.R. 685 (Canada);
the Carlo-Alberto case [1832] S. Jur. I, at 664 (France); [1808] The
Eleanor 6 C.Rob. 39 (U.K.); the Kate A. Hoff, 5 Ann. Dig. 129 (1929).
46. See Article 3 of the draft on the Legal Status of the Territorial Sea
annexed to the Final Act of the Hague Codification Conference, League
of Nations Doc. C.351 (b).M.145 (b).1930.V., at 213. See also the legislation
of Bulgaria, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/6, at 80; the Netherlands, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/16, at 421; Sudan, id. at 30; USSR, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/
SER.B/15, at 211; Yugoslavia, N.w DIREcTioNs, supra note 29, at 35; the
Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 35, at Art. 14. Contra, Jessup,
49 Aiw. J. INTL L. 221 (1955).
47. "Le libre acc~s de nos navires dans les ports de l'Empire est un
droit assur6 en effet par les trait6s aussi bien que par l'usage interna-
tional." II LA PRAssi ITAjANA, supra note 1, at 777.
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The second example involves a decision by the Spanish govern-
ment to forbid the United States' ship Crescent City to enter
Cuban ports. The decision was prompted by the presence on board
of a purser, William Smith, who had previously slandered the
Spanish government. The American representative was instructed
to protest the decision.
You will state that the Government does not question the right
of every nation to prescribe the conditions on which the vessels
of other nations may be admitted into her ports. That, neverthe-
less, those conditions ought not to conflict with the received usages
which regulate the commercial intercourse between civilised na-
tions. That those usages are well known and long established, and
no nation can disregard them without giving just cause of com-
plaint to all other nations whose interests would be affected by
their violation.48
The American view was that in the absence of recognized justifi-
cation, a coastal State may not close its ports to foreign shipping.
This view was later modified when the British government at-
tempted to utilize the same doctrine to prevent the application of
American liquor laws to foreign ships in U.S. waters. The United
States replied that it "did not admit that the case which arose in
1852 forms a serviceable precedent in the present day situation,
more especially as due notice was given of the coming into force
of the recent Supreme Court decision and of the Treasury regu-
lations framed thereunder.
49
The extent of the modification of the 1852 opinion is unclear, but
it does represent a shift toward the broader right of a coastal State
to close its ports when it chooses. Undoubtedly, other examples
of the advancement of the right of entry could be found, but such
examples are certainly not prominent in the practice of States.50
Practice Suggesting that no Right of Entry Exists
The practice of denying the right of entry, grounded in the
concept of sovereignty, dates back many centuries. In early English
practice the King often regulated trade by limiting or denying
48. II MooRE, supra note 1, at 269 (1852).
49. H.G. Chilton to Lord Curzon, 2 Aug. 1923, Public Record Office, Lon-
don [hereinafter cited as PRO]. Foreign Office files A/4540/116/45 (1923),
A/4829/116/45 (1923). The recent decision was Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 100 (1923).
50. However, much practice which appears to acknowledge a right of
entry may be concerned only with the right of nationals. See, e.g., 7 HALs-
BURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 1014 (1974).
access to English ports. For example, on 12 March 1236, Henry III
promulgated the order "Let no foreigner from greater France, or
other power, go to England without license from the King." The
order instructed the Constable of Dover "If any such person lands
within your jurisdiction, other than with our license or our man-
date, then he should immediately be turned back."' '
The same principle is prevalent in modern practice. For example,
a Bulgarian Decree of 10 October 1951 asserted that "[t]he ports
of Stalin and Sozopol are declared closed to navigation by foreign
ships. Other ports ... may be declared closed to navigation by
foreign ships by order of the Council of Ministers.15 2 No limi-
tations on this power are prescribed by the Decree. However, such
powers are often restrictively interpreted in order to be consistent
with the State's view of international law.53 This is especially true
when the powers are exercised by the highest political and legal
officers of a State.
In China no foreign ship is allowed to enter or leave a port or
harbor on a boundary river "except in accordance with the agree-
ment on commercial navigation signed between the Government of
China and the country to which the ship belongs, or with the
approval of the Chinese Government.
5 4
Article 5 of the Roumanian Decree No. 39 of 28 January 1956
provides that the port of Mangalia and a designated zone of Rou-
manian waters are closed to foreign ships. Additionally, it states
that "[o]nly a decision of the Council of Ministers may forbid
access by foreign vessels to other ports or other zones of the Popu-
lar Republic of Roumania.""1 The same comments are applicable
to this power as to Article 7 of the Bulgarian Decree of 1951. In the
United Kingdom the Law Officers of the Crown issued an unequiv-
ocal opinion in 1912 which stated as a matter of international law
that "a sovereign State has complete control over its ports and har-
bours and ... . it may either exclude foreign vessels altogether from
51. "Ne quis extraneus de Francia magnas, vel potens, applicet in Anglia
sine licentia Regis .... [S]i aliquem talem in balliva tua, sine licentia
nostra, vel mandato nostro, de caetero contigerit applicare, scire et facias,
quod statim revertatur." I RYMER, FOEDERA 225 (1816). Cf. id. at 137, 182,
231, 468; Hale, supra note 29.
52. U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER.B/6, at 81.
53. Art. IV, Regulations Governing Foreign Ships on Bordering Rivers,
19 April 1966, cited in Tao Cheng, supra note 29, at 69.
54. MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 434 (1913).
55. "Seule une ddcision du Conseil des ministres peut interdire aux
navires 6trangers d'autres ports ou d'autres zones de la Rpublique Popu-
laire Roumanie." U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/6, at 239.
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entering them for the purposes of trade, or may admit them upon
such terms and conditions as it may choose." 56
The United States Supreme Court in the case of Patterson v. Bark
Eudora anticipated the Law Officers' terminology. Speaking of
foreign merchant ships, the Court stated that "the implied consent
to permit them to enter our harbors may be withdrawn, and if this
consent may be wholly withdrawn, it may be extended upon such
terms and conditions as the government sees fit to impose."57 This
view was followed in later decisions58 and represents the prevailing
opinion in the United States.
Current American law provides that vessels belonging to or
operating under the jurisdiction of a foreign flag which unlawfully
use the American flag "shall be denied for a period of three months
the right to enter the ports or territorial waters of the United States
except in cases of force majeure." 59 This law apparently presumes
that such ships enjoy no right of entry. The denial of entry would
therefore amount to an act of retorsion rather than reprisal. How-
ever, because the provision applies both to ships which have a right
of entry conceded under treaty and to territorial waters in which
there is an unquestioned right of innocent passage, it is not entirely
clear that this statute implies a denial of the right of entry.
In Khedivial Line S.A.E. v. Seafarers International Union,60 the
rejection of a right of entry is quite unequivocal. In that case the
denial of access to the port of New York was caused by the
picketing of the defendant unions. The plaintiff alleged that the
denial was contrary to international law. However, the court held
that:
Plaintiff concedes that there is no treaty between the United States
and the United Arab Republic granting the latter's vessels free ac-
cess to United States ports. Plaintiff has presented no precedents
or arguments to show ... that the law of nations accords an unre-
56. Report of 15 March 1912.
57. 190 U.S. 169, 178 (1903).
58. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923); Strathearn S.S. Co.
v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920).
59. 22 U.S.C. § 454 (1939). See 9 WHImATN, supra note 42, at 45. Cf.
the recent Canadian exclusion of Soviet trawlers from its ports. 79 RGDIP,
supra note 31, at 579 (1975).
60. 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960).
stricted right of access to harbors by vessels of all nations ....
In any event the law of nations would not require more than com-
ity to the ships of a foreign nation, and here the very cause of
the picketing is a harassment of American shipping and seamen
by the United Arab Republic that is not denied.61
The 1974 Deepwater Ports Act 6 2 of the United States lends
further support to the conclusion that no customary right of entry
exists. Section 19(c) of the Act provides:
Except in a situation involving force majeure, a licensee of a deep-
water port shall not permit a vessel, registered in or flying the
flag of a foreign State, to call at, or otherwise utilize a deepwater
port licensed under this Act unless (1) the foreign State involved,
by specific agreement with the United States, has agreed to recog-
nize the jurisdiction of the United States over the vessel and its
personnel . . .while the vessel is located within the safety zone
[around the port].
This section does not merely regulate entry, but requires as a
condition precedent to entry the conclusion of an international
agreement. Although by definition deepwater ports are outside
the territorial seas of the United States, the same principle denying
entry would apply a fortiori to ports situated in internal waters
under the sovereignty of the United States.
A final example of American practice is the Agreement of 19 June
1964 concerning the Use of United Kingdom Ports and Territorial
Waters by the Nuclear Ship Savannah. The agreement provided
that "[e]ntry of N.S. Savannah into any port in United Kingdom
territory shall be subject to the prior approval of the Government
of the United Kingdom. "6 3 The agreement clearly denies the right
of nuclear ships to enter ports. Although the denial of the right
of entry was by express agreement, no reservation was made
protecting the parties' rights under customary law.6 4 It may well
be that the parties did not consider such ships to have a right of
entry. However, this agreement might be considered an example
of the right to deny entry in order to secure the safety of the coastal
State. Such an interpretation is supported by the existence of
legislation enacted in Spain which excepts the passage of nuclear
ships from the concept of innocent passage.6 5
A similar classification problem arises over the assertion of the
power to prohibit navigation in the territorial sea. The existence
61. Id. at 52.
62. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (1974).
63. Exchange of Notes between the United States and United Kingdom
Governments, II NEW DnEcTIoxs, supra note 29, at 654.
64. The "Liquor Treaties" of 1923 included such reservations. See
COLOMBOS supra note 1, at 97.
65. Act No. 25/64, 29 April 1964, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/16, at 45.
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of such a power implies a fortiori the power to deny entry to inter-
nal waters. For example, Italy, Greece, and Korea66 have claimed
this power for defense purposes. In this type of situation, denying
entry can be classified as an example of the right to deny non-
innocent passage. In a case in which actual entry into the port is
concerned, the denial of entry can be considered as the exercise of
the right to deny entry when necessary for coastal security. How-
ever, legislation such as the Soviet Proclamation Regarding Pro-
hibited Areas of Navigation and Anchoring of 1966 is difficult to
classify in this manner. The proclamation provides:
Sometimes it is necessary to prohibit the navigation and anchoring
of vessels in the waters of certain coastal areas of the USSR....
These waters shall be announced as prohibited for a definite pe-
riod of time, temporarily as a rule, and shall be termed "areas tem-
porarily prohibited for navigation."
67
The Proclamation does not limit the right to deny passage to cases
in which the denial is necessary for security, but the orders appear
to have been limited to fortified zones. The Leningrad Notice
To Mariners, No. 265, of 20 September 1924, states that "[s]pecial
regulations for the passage of merchant vessels of the USSR and
also foreign vessels through the zone of firing of coastal batteries
may be introduced only in cases of special military necessity."
6 8 It
is doubtful whether this limitation was regarded as dictated by in-
ternational law especially in view of the "strict respect for the sov-
ereignty of States" which is an essential element of the Soviet view
of international law.6 9 Thus, the practice of prohibiting navi-
gation in the territorial sea may evidence a belief in a right to deny
access to ports.
66. The Italian Law No. 612, 16 June 1912, U.N. ST/LEG/SER.B/6, at 81;
the Greek Law, No. 4141, 26 March 1913, id. at 78; the Korean Marine De-
fence Act, 2 March 1950, id. at 175.
67. W.E. BUTLER, THE LAW OF SOVIET TERRITORIAL WATERS 138 (1967); cf.
Notices to Mariners No. 2, 1955, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/6, at 262; Art. 9,
1960 Regulations on the State Boundary, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/15, at
212, note 29 supra.
68. PRO, supra note 49, Foreign Office file T 5038/5038/380; cf. Instruc-
tions of July 5, 1924, W.E. BUTLER, THE SOVIET UmION AND THE LAW OF =H
SEA 34 (1971); the Latvian Port Decree of 22 Sept. 1924, PRO, supra note
49, Foreign Office Confidential Print No. 13127; Notice of 1941 concerning
Fortified Zones, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/6, at 263; Notice to Mariners,
1 Jan. 1967, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/15, at 186.
69. Cf. BuTLER, supra note 68, at 25; G. TUNKU, THEORY OF INTERNA-
TIONAi, LAW 439 (1974).
Support for the denial of a right of entry in customary law also
exists in multilateral treaty practice. For example, both Article
XVII of the Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear
Powered Ships, 1962,70 and Article 5 (3) of the International Con-
vention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, 71 seem to
presume a right to deny entry. Again, however, it might be argued
that these are simply examples of treaty arrangements or of the
right to deny entry in special circumstances.
Finally, there are a number of cases in which vessels are allowed
port entry but are denied the use of facilities in port.7 2 These cases
are tantamount to a denial of entry because entry under these
circumstances would be pointless. Most cases in which the use of
facilities was denied based the denial on security grounds. Some
cases have involved denial founded solely on political consider-
ations.
The Right of Entry in the Writings of Publicists
Two types of arguments are used to support a right of entry into
maritime ports. One argument attempts to deduce a right of entry
from a wider right in international law, usually a right to trade.
The other attempts to establish a right of entry based on State
practice.
Deductive Arguments in Favor of a Right of Entry
A distinguished list of practitioners including Wolff, de Cussy,
Fauchille, Laun, Politis, Hyde, and Columbos has supported a right
of entry based upon a right of trade or commercial intercourse.
The argument began as a statement of natural law. Wolff wrote
that "Since nations are bound to facilitate commerce, since, more-
over, ports tend to facilitate commerce by sea, nations are bound
to make ports for the sake of maritime commerce and fortify them,
in order that they can be defended against a hostile force, and
security thus be furnished to merchants." 73  A similar argument
was advanced by Mr. Secretary Monroe in 1816. He argued that
"It it consistent with just principles, as it is with the interests of
the United States to receive the vessels of all countries into their
70. 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1963).
71. IMCO Doc. MP/Conf/W.P. 35.
72. See, e.g., 73 RGDIP, supra note 31, at 449 (Japan), at 767 (UK),
(1969) ; 74 id. at 453 (1970).
73. Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractum 115 (1764) (Classics of
Int'l Law trans. 1934).
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ports, to whatever party belonging and under whatever flag
sailing. .... -74
The right of commerce later evolved into a more precise formula
which denied the right of any State to isolate itself from com-
mercial intercourse. Politis expounded the principle in this form
during his lectures at the Hague in 1925. 75 A similar argument was
expressed by Hyde when he stated:
[A]s no State appears to be regarded as having the right to isolate
itself wholly from the outside world, or to remain aloof from all
commercial or economic intercourse with it, there would seem to
be a corresponding obligation imposed upon maritime powers not
to deprive foreign vessels of commerce of access to all its ports.76
Perhaps surprisingly these arguments never enjoyed widespread
support from jurists. Even writers like Pufendorf and Vattel, who
were close to the natural law tradition and accepted the broad prin-
ciple of freedom of commerce, felt constrained by the principle of
coastal sovereignty over ports to qualify that freedom. Thus,
Vattel wrote that "it is clear that it is for each Nation to decide
whether it will carry on commerce with another or not. ' 7 The
principle of free commerce never made the transition from a
principle of foreign policy to a rule of law. The only instances of
its application cited by recent writers relate to the opening up of
Japan in the 1850's and of China early in the twentieth century.
Both instances, however, resulted in the establishment of a right of
commerce by treaty. It is doubtful whether China or Japan
accepted the principle of freedom of commerce as a rule of law.
73
The principle was, rather, an attempt to force juridical foundations
under the existing structure of colonial policy.
The distinction between the principle of foreign policy, which is
admitted, and the rule of law, which is not, is evident in the English
Law Officers Report of 28 December 1896: "There is no principle
of international law imposing upon any State (apart from Treaty)
74. II MOORE, supra note 1, at 269.
75. I HAGUE RECEUIL, 1925 at 32-35.
76. HYDE, supra note 1, at 582. But see id. at 676.
77. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 41
(1758) (Classics of Int'l Law trans. 1916). Cf. PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATU-
RAE ET GENTImU, LIBRI OCTO 567-68 (1688) (Classics of Int'l Law trans.
1934).
78. See, e.g., PoLITIs, supra note 1; 1 FAUcHILLE, id. at 483-87.
the duty of permitting commercial intercourse. It would, however,
be a violation of international comity and of right conduct as be-
tween civilised States to forbid such intercourse without some ade-
quate reason.
'79
There is not sufficient evidence to support the proposition that
the principle of free commerce has become a rule of customary in-
ternational law. Thus, no right of entry can be deduced, even if
such a right were thought to be implicit in a right to free commerce.
This is not to say that the exigencies of international relations do
not in fact constitute a principle which effectively prohibits
economic isolation; this principle simply is not a rule of law.
Lapradelle argued that a right of entry could be deduced from
the general right of navigation on the seas.80 He expounded the
view that the juridical regime of all parts of the seas, including
territorial waters and ports, should assume a basic principle of
freedom of navigation. Although Lapradelle's theory received
some support, it never gained general acceptance.
By the close of the 1930 Hague Conference, the principle of coastal
sovereignty over coastal waters, although limited by rights of
passage, was generally accepted. There is absolutely no basis
in State practice for interpreting the principle of the freedom of
the seas to include a right of entry to maritime ports.
Inductive Arguments in Favor of a Right of Entry
The second type of argument claims that, by inductive reasoning,
a right of entry can be established on the basis of State practice.
With the exception of those authors who cite the Aramco decision,
leading authorities cite only treaties as evidence of State practice
which supports a right of entry in customary international
law. Laun, for example, argues that because rights of entry exist
under treaty in the great majority of ports in the world
this liberal regime can hardly be considered as exceptional in the
law of nations any longer: Rather, there is reason to admit that it
is an international juridical point of view which is universally
shared. Thus, it can be stated, according to the juridical opinion
prevailing at the moment, that free access to seaports is guaranteed
to vessels of all States members of the family of nations, even if
this right is not based upon a special treaty.
79. Cited in I A. McNAm, INTERNATiONAL LAW OPINIONs 338-43 (1956).
See also LAuTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 321 & 675 (1956); 1
Op. ATT'Y GEN. 659 (1852).
80. Cf. XXIII ANNUAIRE, supra note 10, at 111 (1910); 5 RGDIP, supra
note 31, at 264-84, 309-47 (1898).
81. [O]n ne peut plus gu~re considerer ce r~gime liberal comme un
regime particulier en droit des gens: il y a plfitot lieu d'admettre qu'il
y a I& une mani~re de voir juridique internationale, qui est universellement
partag~e. C'est pourquoi l'on peut dire que, d'aprs la conviction juridique
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No evidence exists that States regard the right of entry as a
principle of preexisting or customary law, although a right of entry
is included in many hundreds of bilateral treaties. Because the pro-
visions of such treaties lack the "fundamentally norm-creating
character" necessary for the transition, the mere repetition of rights
of entry in these treaties could not constitute a rule of customary
law.
8 2
The writers who deny the existence of a right of entry have an
easier task. They have only to assert that ports are subject to the
sovereignty of the coastal State, that limitations upon that sover-
eignty cannot be presumed, and that no relevant limitations have
been established. This, essentially, is what they have done.
8 3
CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE CUSTOMARY LAW
The available evidence concerning customary law is sparse and
often equivocal. Although the law appears to indicate that no right
of entry exists, no positive rule of customary international law can
be established. Thus, the question can be phrased only as a pre-
sumption-that is, should the doubt be resolved in favor of the right
of the coastal State to deny entry or instead in favor of a right
of entry for foreign ships?
Clearly the presumption lies in favor of the right of the coastal
State to deny entry. The sovereignty of States over their ports
and the fundamental rule of international law that limitations upon
sovereignty must be established by those claiming their existence.8 4
dominante a 'heure qu'il est, le libre acc~s dans les ports de mer est garanti
aux navires de tous les Etats appartement A la communaut6 du droit des
gens, m~me si ce droit n'est pas bas6 sur un trait6 sp6ciale . . . LAUN,
p. 30.
82. See text accompanying notes 27 & 28 supra. Cf. D.W. GREIG, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 286 (2d ed. 1976).
83. See, e.g., [1957] 45(I) ANNUAIRE, supra note 10, at 132-33; [1957]
47(11) ANNUAIRE, id. at 167-273 & 485-88; I. BROWNLIE, THE PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 276 (1973); III GiDEL, supra note 13, at 46 & 50;
Y.B. INT'L L. 42, 53 (1922). Hurst, The Territoriality of Bays, III BRIT.
M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER or =H OcEANs 110-13 (1962);
See especially HYDEMAN & BERMAN, supra note 32, at 130-42. Cf. Economic
Cooperation in Merchant Shipping, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/C. 4/136, at 5-6
& 16-17 (1975).
84. The Lotus case, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 18 (1927). Cf. I.G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (1957). A British Government
require this conclusion. Consequently, the burden of proof is
upon those asserting the right of entry. It has been argued that
this burden has not been discharged and that recognized sources
of law have created no exception to the sovereignty of States over
ports which would give a right of entry to foreign ships.
If the sovereignty of the port State were inherently limited, the
operation of this presumption could be avoided. In his opinion
in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, Judge Alvarez cast doubt
upon the validity of arguments based on presumptions arising from
the sovereignty of States. Referring to the right of States to do
everything not expressly forbidden by international law, he stated:
This principle, formerly correct, in the days of absolute sovereignty,
is no longer so at the present day: the sovereignty of States is
henceforth limited not only by the rights of other States, but also
by other factors ... which make up what is called the new inter-
national law: the Charter of the United Nations, resolutions passed
by the Assembly of the United Nations, the duties of States, the
general interests of international society and lastly the prohibitions
of abus de droit.85
Early in the twentieth century the idea of limited coastal State
sovereignty over the territorial sea was widely argued. The idea
was also mooted in debates leading to the conclusion of the Ge-
neva Conventions on the Law of the Sea. However, no limita-
tion obliging States to admit foreign merchant ships to their
ports was established in international law. Furthermore, no
suggestion was made that limitations on sovereignty might arise
from sources other than those recognized as creating international
law and obligations. Indeed, such novel sources could not limit
sovereignty if, as Alvarez admits, there was a time when absolute
sovereignty and the concommitant presumption of liberty were
once the rule, for the ability of agencies of the "new international
law" to prescribe limitations on sovereignty must itself have been
established by the agreement of States. No evidence exists that
such a far-reaching principle was ever accepted by States. How-
ever, undoubtedly the factors which Alvarez mentions exert a
powerful influence on the policies of States. But, even if his argu-
ment were correct, there is no obvious source of an obligation to
admit foreign merchant ships to a State's ports. There are, how-
ever, many strong reaffirmations of States' sovereignty over their
territory.8 6
Interdepartmental Committee reported that "the closing of a port on the
national territory is a legitimate exercise of the sovereignty of the State."
PRO, supra note 49, Foreign Office file T9446/81/337 (1928).
85. [1952] I.C.J. 152.
86. See, e.g., the Declaration on Principles of International Law, annexed
25 U.N.G.A. Res. 2625.
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Clearly, the "great principle of public international law" set forth
in the Aramco case had no substantive basis, and customary law
establishes no basis for a right of entry into maritime ports. In
other words, a coastal State may close its ports to foreign shipping
whenever it chooses, subject only to any rights of entry granted
under treaty.
Qualifications to the Right to Close Ports
Some may argue that the right to deny entry is limited by the
principle of abuse of rights. This principle does not affect the
present argument because a right to deny entry must exist before
it can be abused. It is tempting to speculate that the right would
be held to have been abused if it were exercised in circumstances
other than those in which a right to close on grounds of necessity
had already been clearly established. However if the right to close
were established, the onus would be upon those asserting the abuse.
They would have to prove that the right was so limited. It has
been argued that such a limitation on the right to close cannot be
found as a rule of customary international law. However, two
principles qualify the right.
At various points in this article, opinions have been cited which
suggest that although there is no obligation to allow entry to ports,
there is a presumption in favor of entry which exists absent some
indication to the contrary.87 Additionally, the opinions expressed
in the case of the Exchange v. McFaddon88 and in the United States'
Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations support the pre-
sumption of an open port. The court in the Exchange case found
that "[u]nless closed by local law the ports of a friendly nation
are considered as open to the public ships of all powers with which
it is at peace."89 The argument applies with equal force to mer-
chant ships. The Restatement provides that "[i]n the case of
vessels not in military service, the ports of a State are open to their
visit without any prior notification, except where the State has
expressly provided otherwise."9 0  The presumption that ports are
open is reasonable because it corresponds to the practice of States.
87. See text accompanying notes 11-15, 20, & 57.
88. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 287 (1813).
89. Id. at 2.
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 50 (1965).
This presumption is one of fact which does not affect the right to
close ports.
A second qualification is the 1896 suggestion by the British Law
Officers that to forbid foreign merchant ships to enter maritime
ports would be a breach of international comity.01 This suggestion
may also be accepted as an accurate reflection of the expectations of
States. However it does not prejudice their legal rights.
CONCLUSION
The conclusions of this article can be summarized by attempting
to formulate the law concerning the entry of foreign merchant ships
into maritime ports. These conclusions must be considered in the
light of comments on matters peripheral to the right of entry.
First, the ports of a State which are designated for international
trade are, in the absence of express provisions to the contrary made
by a port State, presumed to be open to the merchant ships of all
States. Second, such ports should not 92 be closed to foreign mer-
chant ships except when the peace, good order, or security of
the coastal State necessitates closure.
91. See note 78 supra.
92. A precedent for the inclusion of a rule of comity in a convention
will be found in Art. 19(1) of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, supra
note 29.
